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A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY
RULES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
IAN BROWNLIE*
THE ESSENTIAL MODESTY OF CUSTOMARY LAW
The perspective adopted in this paper is a simple one: customary
law provides limited means of social engineering, and, therefore,
there is a particular need for the development of new institutions,
standards, and localized regimes to deal with the protection of the
environment. At the same time, the rules of customary law have a
certain role which should not be underestimated. In particular,
positions established by customary rules have to be considered, at the
least on the basis that they provide some fundamental competences
and liabilities which set the scene for the further development of the
law. This is the case despite the fact that the competences allowed
by the customary law contain a certain freedom to abuse the
environment.
Though the position may soon change, general international law (or
customary law) contains no rules or standards related to the protection of the environment as such. Three sets of rules have major
relevance nonetheless. First, the rules relating to state responsibility
have a logic and vitality not to be despised or taken for granted.
Secondly, the territorial sovereignty of States has a double impact. It
provides a basis for individualist use and enjoyment of resources
without setting any high standards of environmental protection.
However, it also provides a basis for imposition of State responsibility
on a sovereign State causing, maintaining, or failing to control a
source of nuisance to other States. Thirdly, the concept of the
freedom of the seas (and its clear equivalent in the case of outer space
and celestial bodies) contains elements of reasonable user and
non-exhaustive enjoyment which approach standards for environmental protection, although they are primarily based upon the concept of
successful sharing rather than conservation in itself. Unfortunately,
general principles or concepts are no basis for a sufficient program of
action: detailed regulations are needed. The rotund wisdom of the
freedom of the seas has not, for instance, prevented the considerable
degradation of the Baltic Sea. On this somewhat skeptical note, a
survey of the particular institutions of general international law may
be attempted.
*Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford. Copyright is reserved
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IMPOSITION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
When a State causes, maintains, or fails to control a source of harm
to other States, or to the nationals of other States, then existing
principles of State responsibility provide bases of liability no less
sophisticated than those of systems of municipal law. The nature of
the liability is similar to that of vicarious or enterprise liability in
Common Law tort doctrine: that is to say, the corporate body bears
responsibility for the acts and omissions of its servants or agents acting
within the scope of their actual or apparent authority.' Such
relatively strict liability necessarily applies to unauthorized acts of
officials and to situations not involving acts of officials but which a
normal government would be expected to control. The Corfu Channel
Case 2 establishes what is in effect a prima facie liability for the
harmful effects of conditions created even by trespassers of which the
territorial sovereign has knowledge or means of knowledge. There is
much State practice concerning responsibility for supporting or
harbouring armed bands on State territory whose activities affect
other States.3 Such practice provides a firm basis for claims relating to
other nuisances. It provides a firmer basis, in fact, than the overworked Trail Smelter arbitration, 4 which is actually a rather modest
contribution to the jurisprudence-as it was bound to be in view of the
restricted terms of reference with which the Tribunal worked.
There is no doubt that standards of care will vary with the nature of
the activity causing pollution or other damage to neighboring States.
Existing customary law is tolerant of a degree of "ordinary user"
including certain, at present tolerated, levels of contamination and
pollution. However, the relevant standards may be changed by the
availability of expertise in economic control of sources of pollution,
by particularized complaints from other States and competent
intergovernmental organizations, and by the influence of standards set
by multilateral conventions. An obvious point, nevertheless one worth
making, is the presumption against the reasonableness of user which
arises when a polluting effect is intended.
The position taken by the Japanese Government in face of
atmospheric nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific contains elements of
general significance. On 14 February 1958 the United States Atomic
Energy Commission issued a public notice of the danger area to be
established on 5 April in connection with a series of nuclear tests to be
1. Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts 171-72 (1967); Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in
the Law of Torts 22-27 (1967).
2. I.C.J. Reports (1949). In English and Australian law cf. Sedleigh-Denfield v. O'Callaghan
[1940] A.C. 880; Goldman v. Hargrave [1967] 1 A.C. 645, P.C.
3. Brownlie, InternationalLaw and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Int'l & Comparative
L.Q. 712 (1958).
4. R.I.A.A., 111 (1905).
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conducted at the Eniwetok Proving Ground in the Marshall Islands.
The area comprised roughly 390,000 square nautical miles. The
5
danger area was subsequently "disestablished" on 8 September 1958.
In February 1958 the Japanese Government protested (in part) in the
following terms:
The United States Government states that every possible
precaution will be taken to prevent damage and injury to human
lives and property in the danger zone and that there is no
probability of any accidents outside the danger zone. Whatever
precaution is taken, however, the Japanese Government is greatly
concerned over conducting of nuclear tests and establishment of a
danger zone for that purpose in view of the fact that said zone is
near to routes of the Japanese merchant marine and to fishing
grounds of Japanese fishing boats.
Accordingly, the Japanese Government would like to make
clear its view that in the event the United States Government
conducts nuclear tests in defiance of the request of the Japanese
Government, the United States Government has the responsibility
of compensating for economic losses that may be caused by the
establishment of a danger zone and for all losses and damages that
may be inflicted on Japan and the Japanese people as a result of
the nuclear tests. The Japanese Government wishes to reserve the
right to demand complete compensation for such losses and
6
damages.
The reply of the United States Government included the following
passages:
Finally, as the United States has previously indicated, it cannot
be regarded as established on the basis of present information that
substantial economic losses will result from the establishment of
the danger area. Moreover, in view of precautions which will be
observed during the tests and existing public information with
respect to maximum permissible levels of radiation, the United
States Government anticipates no economic losses from radioactive contamination of marine life.
However, if, after the test series has ended, any evidence is
officially presented that substantial economic losses for Japan or
Japanese nationals have been incurred as a result of establishment
of the danger area and the tests, the United States is prepared in
the interest of the fullest understanding and cooperation between
the two countries to give consideration to the question of
compensation in the light of such evidence. 7
5. 4 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 578-95 (1965).

6. Id. at 585-86.
7.

4 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 586-87 (1965).
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Certain aspects of this exchange relate exclusively to the question
of reservation and monopolized use of areas of the high seas which
have the status of res communis. Other aspects have a more general
application. Whether or not one accepts the Japanese contention that
nuclear tests give rise to certain duties, and whether or not one
accepts the United States contention that no or no substantial
economic losses would result from the -tests, certain general principles
seem to be asserted or admitted by each of the two Governments.
First, the taking of precautions does not preclude responsibility if the
risks are foreseeably high at the outset and damage is in fact caused.
Secondly, harm caused by contamination of resources may ground a
claim for economic losses, distinct from such a claim based upon
deprivation of access to resources in the closed or danger area. A
general matter arising is the claim by a State in respect of economic
losses caused to its nationals as a global sum rather than in respect of
specific claims of individuals and corporations. These principles,
related to the concept of contamination of peripatetic resources to
which others have a legitimate claim, have general application to
cases in which State territory and airspace are used for purposes
which cause, or which may reasonably be expected to cause,
contamination of aspects of the environment which are naturally
intra-territorial, viz. airstream, rainfall, percolating water sources,
glacial material which is mobile, and soil and sand distributed by
natural drainage systems or wind action prevalent in a particular
region.
It is very probably the case that the existing principles of State
responsibility give ample houseroom to the conceptions reported
above. The claim for economic loss to the State itself, though not a
usual occurrence, is by no means ruled out as a matter of principle. 8
INDISCRIMINATE HARMS AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
It is well known that a characteristic of pollution of the atmosphere, the high seas, and the hydrologic cycle in general, is the
gradual and dispersed nature of the processes of degradation.
Cumulative processes involve problems of identifying tortfeasors, of
establishing evidence of causation, and of remoteness of damage. It is
doubtful if changes in the law can circumvent such problems; they
are inherent in the liability approach to environmental protection. 9
8. See Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 269-72 (1970) (Judge Gros,
Separate Opinion).
9. Similar problems exist in municipal law, of course, Cf. multiple defendant cases such as
Woods v. Duncan, [1946] A.C. 401; Cook v. Lewis, [1952] 2 D.L.R.1; Pride of Derby Angling
Association v. British Celanese, Ltd., [1953, Ch. 149.
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The problems certainly indicate the major limitations of this approach.
One improvement which might be encouraged is a liberal approach
to locus standi if it should happen that certain standards of
environmental conservation come to be regarded as binding erga
omnes. 10 At the least, and as an interim approach, the creation of
standards by means of multilateral conventions, comparable to the
Genocide Convention in another field, could be linked with the
concept of the actio popularis akin to the liberal view of legal interest
supported by several dissenting Judges in the South West Africa Cases
(Second Phase)." This apparently radical concept is simply another
form of expressing the interest which parties to a standard-setting
instrument have in the observance of the obligations by other parties.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: SOME PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
OF CONTROL
It has already been pointed out that the territorial sovereign may
be responsibile for the consequences of activities of visitors and even
trespassers within the territory and territorial sea. This situation was
covered by the Corfu Channel Case' 2 which is completely apposite
despite the dramatic forms assumed both by the causes of harm and
the consequences of the laying of mines without warning. In the
context of environmental protection, States have a responsibility for
the processes carried on both by private enterprise and by public
corporations (quasi-governmental entities).
Exercise of jurisdiction over extra-territorial events may in practice
cause problems in the present context. It is no doubt true that the
protective or security principle of jurisdiction could be suitably
invoked. 13 It might be that at some time in the future certain forms of
threat to the environment, in particular those which are known to
cause intolerable risks, including irreversible forms of degradation,
and waste, may be assimilated to the category delicta juris gentium, of
which the paradigm case is piracy. If that were to happen, then
jurisdiction could be exercised in accordance with the principle of
universality.14
Certain duties may be placed upon the flag State of merchant
vessels. It is possible that such a duty is contained within the
provisions of Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas:
10. On the category of obligations erga omnes see the majority judgment (twelve Judges) in
the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 2, 32 (1970).
11. I.C.J. Reports 6, 225-29 (1966), (Wellington Koo), 242-8 (Koretsky), 251-4 (Tanaka),
352-88 (Jessup), 461-4 (Padilla Nervo), 478-82 (Forster), 501-5 (Mbanefo).
12. I.C.J. Reports Merits, 4 (1949).
13. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 296-99 (2nd ed.).
14. Id. at 297.
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Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of
the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting
from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil,
taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject. 15
Where duties are based upon the fact of registration, problems may
arise in the case of so-called flags of convenience. In theory, a State
might seek to avoid responsibility for the consequences of a breach of
duty by pleading that the registration was not accompanied by
effective exercise of jurisdiction and control as required by Article 5
of the Convention on the High Seas. In practice, and for obvious
reasons, such plea is unlikely to be put forward. In any case, recourse
is normally available in municipal courts against shipowners and
charterers. It is also necessary to avoid the assumption that the
ownership aspect of flags of convenience rules out any real control by
the flag State. The aftermath of the Torrey Canyon disaster did not
include any claim by the United Kingdom against Liberia; recourse
was had to appropriate national courts. Liberia, however, convened a
Board of Investigation which placed responsibility upon the error of
the master alone and recommended that the master's license be
revoked.16
Complex problems of jurisdiction and control may also arise in
relation to operations of multinational corporations when these cause
risks to the environment.
SPECIAL ZONES OF JURISDICTION
Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone refers expressly to the creation of contiguous zones to prevent
infringement of "customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations .... ." In its commentary 17 appended to the relevant draft
article, the International Law Commission remarked that "in view of
connection between customs and sanitary regulations, such rights
should also be recognized for sanitary regulations." Such zones might
be held to accommodate measures to prevent pollution, but the
position is by no means clear. It is perhaps an academic matter since,
at present, it is very probable that a twelve mile territorial sea claim
would receive recognition from the majority of States. The motivation
for the extension to twelve miles of the territorial sea of France in
1971 was, it is reported, the need to exercise jurisdiction and control
over the traffic of oil tankers in the English Channel. There is little
15. See also Article 25 relating to the dumping of radioactive waste.
16. Report; International Legal Materials 480 (1967).
17. Yearbook, I.L.C., 1956, II, 294-5.
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doubt that reasonable measures to reduce pollution risks may
condition the concept of innocent passage. 18
By the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970,19 Canada has
established a special belt of jurisdiction, one hundred miles in
breadth, on her Arctic seaboard. 20 The United States has protested
this measure and denied the existence of any basis in international law
for such an extension of jurisdiction on the high seas. The Canadian
position, as it emerges from official statements, is that existing
international law is inadequate in face of the threat to the ecology of
the Arctic posed by tanker traffic. It is possible that, like the original
Proclamation of the United States President concerning the Continental Shelf in 1945, the Canadian measure will launch a new development in State practice. However, as it stands, it is simply one of
several examples of coastal States disparately claiming exclusive
jurisdiction over marine areas in order to foster and protect particular
interests vital to their needs. The Canadian claim is comparable to
the non-contiguous fishery conservation zones claimed by certain
by others in the recent past to zones 100
States and the similar claims
21
or 200 miles in breadth.
The legal regime of the continental shelf impinges on the issue of
pollution in several aspects. Article 5 of the Continental Shelf
Convention provides in paragraph 1 that the exploration of the shelf
and the exploitation of its natural resources "must not result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation
of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with
fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out
with the intention of open publication." The same article provides for
the creation of safety zones around "installations and other devices
necessary for" the exploration and exploitation of the shelf; and
paragraph 7 requires the coastal State " to undertake, in the safety
zones, all appropriate measures for the protection of the living
resources of the sea from harmful agents." It is to be recalled that in
the North Sea Continental Shelf 22 Cases the majority of the Court
considered that only the first three articles of the Convention
18. Compare the restrictions by Malaysia and Indonesia on tankers over 200,000 deadweight
tons using the Malacca Straits. The two States concerned do not characterize the straits as
'international straits.' See Relsing Contemporary Archives 252 (1971-72).
19. Statutes of Canada 1969-70, Chap. 47; IX International Legal Materials 543 (1970).
20. See generally Canadian Yearbook of International Law 284-5, 287-94 (1971); International Legal Materials, IX (1970), 598-615; Morin, Canadian Yearbook 206-15 (1970); Fawcett,
Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law 418-21 (1970); Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 Mich. L.R. 1 (1970); Green,
InternationalLaw and Canada'sAnti-Pollution Legislation, 50 Ore. L.R. 462 (1971).
21. For details: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 218-19, 228-29 (2d ed.).
22. I.C.J. Reports 3 (1969).
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constituted general international law. In any case, paragraph 7
presents a duty of conservation in a very restricted context. There is
some attraction in the argument that the exercise of an anti-pollution
jurisdiction by the coastal State would be justified as a corollary of the
regime of "the sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring [the shelf]
and exploiting its natural resources." This suggestion does not,
however, derive any support from the assertion by the Netherlands of
certain rights of jurisdiction over fixed installations on the shelf as a
means of control over pirate broadcasting, since the measure concerned2 3 was not based upon the doctrine of the continental shelf. 24
RESORT TO SELF-HELP
When the Torrey Canyon was stranded, the British Government
authorized the use of bombing as a means of mitigating the results of
the disaster.2 5 This constituted a form of forcible self-help in an area
of the high seas.26 It may be that there is a principle of necessity
justifying such remedial action. If not, then the consent of the State of
registration should be obtained. In any case it is illogical and
unnecessary to regard any such principle of necessity as may exist as a
form of "self-defence.- 2 7 Quoting the Caroline correspondence is
unhelpful since the famous Webster formula simply says that what is
lawful is that which is necessary and thus is pleonastic.
Doctrines of self-help and necessity suffer from a confusion of
rationale and definition. In other words, a rationale stated in very
general terms is conceived of as a definition-which it is not. It is
significant that the issue of self-help was quite soon approached by
means of multilateral convention: the International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties,28 signed at Brussels in 1969. In ordinary circumstances,
polluting activities by merchant vessels are the object of control and
jurisdiction by the flag State alone.
THE FORMATION OF NEW STANDARDS IN
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
By way of conclusion, the sources of new rules and standards of
general international law may be noticed. Multilateral conventions
and resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations
23. The North Seas Installations Act, 1964.
24. See van Panhuys & van EnideBeas, 60 Am. J. Int. L. 3, 326-36 (1966).
25. E. Lauterpacht, British Practice in International Law 90-92 (1967).
26. It is not clear that the action of the United Kingdom was accompanied by any opinio
juris. The relevant White Paper, Cmnd. 3246, states that "neither legal nor financial
considerations inhibited government action at any stage ....
27. See Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 Current Legal Problems 113, 126-27
(1968).
28. Text at 64 Am. J. Int'l L. 471 (1970); 9 InternationalLegal Materials25 (1970).
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alongside evidence of the views of governments, for example, in the
form of diplomatic exchanges, may constitute evidence of emergent
or existing principles of international law. In a field such as that of
protection of the environment, multilateral reaction to problems is to
be expected. Two examples of the genesis of general standards follow:
In 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 29 containing a
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction. The text of the Declaration contains three standard-setting paragraphs of considerable interest, as follows:
11. With respect to activities in the area and acting in
conformity with the international r6gime to be established, States
shall take appropriate measures for and shall co-operate in the
adoption and implementation of international rules, standards and
procedures for, interalia:
(a) Prevention of pollution and contamination, and other
hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline,
and of interference with the ecological balance of the
marine environment;
(b) Protection and conservation of the natural resources
of the area and prevention of damage to the flora and fauna
of the marine environment.
12. In their activities in the area, including those relating to its
resources, States shall pay due regard to the rights and legitimate
interests of coastal States in the region of such activities, as well as
of all other States which may be affected by such activities.
Consultations shall be maintained with the coastal States concerned with respect to activities relating to the exploration of the
area and the exploitation of its resources with a view to avoiding
infringement of such rights and interests.
13. Nothing herein shall affect:
(a) The legal status of the waters superjacent to the area
or that of the air space above those waters;
(b) The rights of coastal States with respect to measures
to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution
or threat thereof resulting from, or from other hazardous
occurrences caused by, any activities in the area, subject to
the international r6gime to be established.
Apart from the intrinsic value of these paragraphs, paragraph 13(b)
is of interest in the particular respect that it reflects the content of the
29. Resolution 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970, 108 in tavour, none against, with 14
abstentions. Text: I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law 112 (2d ed.).
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International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties noted above.
A second example is found in the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, 30 where the following
principles are set forth:
21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
22. States shall cooperate to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities
within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.
Paragraph 21 is in part, at least, a statement of existing legal
principles; and the General Assembly has affirmed the dominant
character of those principles in Resolution 2996 (XXVII),31 which
"Declares that no resolution adopted at the twenty-seventh session of
the General Assembly can affect principles 21 and 22 of the
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment."
Principle 21, precisely because it rests upon classical legal conceptions, relies upon the liability principle. This has notorious limitations
both as a loss distribution system and as a basis for efficient policies of
prevention. Principle 21 is, in one aspect, an assertion of the reserved
domain of domestic jurisdiction. In this sphere of liberty, States may
still permit certain risk-creating activities such as the design and
construction of very large oil tankers.
General international law concerning liability has a further weakness as a control. It may be a general principle of law, within the
terms of Article 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court,
that the poverty of a tortfeasor is a ground for reduction of damages.
This possibility, studiously ignored by international lawyers from
developed States, has support in the recent scholarship of comparative law. 3 2 There is more than a hint of this logic in Principle 23 of
the Stockholm Declaration. In this part of the text, the relevant
30. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1; 9 International Legal Materials 1416 (1972).
31. December 15, 1972; 112 in favour, none against, with 10 abstentions. See further Second
Committee report A/8901.
32. McGregor, Personal Injury and Death, Int'l Encyclopedia of Comparative L. vol. XI,
Torts, (ed.) Tunc, ch. 9, Personal Injury and Death 11-12 (1972).
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standards are stated to be variable according to the level of
development of the various States.

